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Abstract: 
This article aims to analyze Amartya Sen’s definition of poverty. To achieve this goal 
initially we will present the traditional definitions of poverty: a) in absolute terms (focus 
on the subsistence concept); b) or in relative terms (focus on the deprivation concept). 
Next, the article addresses the Sen x Townsend debate, that happened in the first half of 
the 1980 decade. Then, we will discuss the Senian perspective of poverty in terms of the 
lack of capabilities. We present three reasons why the definition of poverty in terms of 
capabilities is more appropriate than its predecessors: a) it comprises both an absolute and 
a relative element; b) it is not only a philosophically grounded definition of poverty, but 
it has the potential to guide empirical research and social policies directed to fight 
poverty; c) it considers the interpersonal and intersocial differences among people 
(conversion factors); d) in this definition it is fundamental to listen to people in order to 
define their own necessities, there is no previous theoretically-based capabilities list. 
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Introduction 
To define poverty is not an easy task, especially because poverty is a complex and 
very contested social phenomenon. As Lister (2004) points out, there is no single concept 
of poverty that is detached of its cultural and historical roots, moreover, different groups 
in society tend to construct different ways of seeing the causes and the ways of dealing 
with poverty. 
The definitions of poverty found in the academic and also non-academic literature 
tend to vary according to diverse aspects, we might list some of those as the following: 
a) the worldview of the observer that might change the way he or she sees the poverty 
phenomenon; b) the economic structure, the social arrangements and also religious beliefs 
might change also the perspective about the roots/causes of poverty; c) to be poor in a 
developing country might be different of being poor in a developed one; d) the way that 
the poor see their own condition might be different from the view of a policymaker or a 
researcher. These are only some of the aspects that show how contested and controversial 
a definition of poverty can be. 
Despite the difficulties in finding a common definition of the analyzed 
phenomenon, to look for this consensual concept is an important task, not only 
theoretically or empirically, but also practically, considering that this definition might 
guide public policies designed to fight poverty or to ameliorate the conditions of people 
who are poor. Depending on the definition adopted is also possible to advocate the 
suspension of all public policies that try to help the poor, as Malthus (1992) did in the late 
18th century and some authors like Murray (1984, 1999) do in the present days. 
As Alcock (2006, p. 64) says: “Arguably it is the definition of poverty that lies at 
the heart of our task in understanding poverty. We must first know what poverty is before 
we can identify where and when it is occurring or attempt to measure it, and before we 
begin doing anything to alleviate it”.  
Looking at the traditional definitions of poverty it is possible to identify two main 
streams that have received considerable support from the literature: a) an absolute 
perspective, that focuses mainly on the material conditions that are minimal in order to 
someone sustain his/her own life; and b) a relative perspective, that sees poverty as a 
phenomenon that varies according to the standards of living of each society. Another 
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perspective that will be the focus of this paper, is the concept of poverty as lack of 
capabilities, as proposed by Amartya Sen. 
The Senian approach can be seen as a third view, that ends the dichotomy absolute 
x relative poverty, considering that both aspects are important, though insufficient, in 
order to understand what the meaning of poverty is. Thus, the objective of the present 
paper is to present the Senian perspective. To achieve this goal, in the first section the 
absolute and relative definitions of poverty and the ways of measurement of poverty will 
be discussed. The second section, then, will present the Sen x Townsend debate that 
happened in the mid-1980s and finally the third section will approach the definition of 
poverty of Sen. Then, we try to specify the reasons why the definition of Sen is more 
adequate than its predecessors. 
1. Traditional definitions of poverty 
The absolute definition of poverty is related with the first scientific studies of the 
subject, that where conducted by Boot, Rowntree and colleagues in the beginning of the 
20th century. This definition is based on the notion of subsistence, understood as the 
minimum needed to sustain a life (i.e. to survive). According to this perspective, people 
that are below the subsistence level are absolutely poor because they do not have enough 
to live on and to sustain their own life by his/her own ways. If subsistence is not provided 
to them they will starve to death, they will freeze if they live in a country with cold 
weather or they will die because of the heat if they live in a country characterized by high 
temperatures (ALCOCK, 2006; LISTER, 2004). 
The basic idea of absolute poverty is that it is necessary to understand what people 
need to survive and then ensure that the poor receive this, and nothing more. Then, the 
objective of public action is to ensure that people have minimal conditions of access to 
food and shelter until they are levelled to the line of poverty, that might be defined in 
terms of a general amount of money (US$ 1,00 or US$ 2,00 per day), or in terms of a 
certain amount of calories in a diet, or another variable, that allow to define what is 
necessary to subsist. 
The relative concept of poverty has roots in the critics of the absolute notions of 
poverty and the postwar welfare state achievements in United Kingdom (UK). According 
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to Alcock (2006), their basic argument was that the policies to prevent subsistence 
poverty had no effect in terms of making the conditions of the poor better when compared 
with the average standard of living in the UK. In support of that, research has shown that 
the poorest were no better off in the period between 1950 and 1960 than they had been in 
the 1940 decade.  
The relative definitions of poverty focus not only on subsistence, but also in the 
conditions to participate in activities that are customary in a specific society. Townsend 
(1979, p. 31) defines poverty in this way:  
Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack 
the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in activities and have the living conditions 
and amenities that are customary […] in the societies to which they belong. 
It is noticeable in that quotation that a person can be considered poor if that person 
cannot access the average standards of living of his/her community in terms not only of 
their diet, but also considering the possibilities to participate in social activities and the 
possibility to have the amenities that are customary to his/her society. For example, in a 
society that values the practice of sports, like soccer, to have access to watch a soccer 
match (in a stadium, by radio, television or other kinds of media) can be an important 
element for someone to be considered part of that society. 
Townsend’s definition is usually reported as very similar Adam Smith’s account 
of the subject in his Wealth of Nations: 
By necessaries, I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for 
the support of life but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable 
people, even of the lowest order to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is strictly speaking 
not a necessary of life […] But in present time […] a creditable day labourer would be 
ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt (SMITH, 1791, p. 240-241).  
 Smith points out in this extract that the minimal necessary to live varies according 
to the customs from the society where people live. In the light of those terms, to consider 
that someone is poor only because he cannot afford to have a subsistence diet is a too 
strict definition. Taking the Smithian passage we can see that in the Britain of his time 
the modest laborer would find himself ashamed if he did not have a linen shirt or even a 
pair of leather shoes to be in public. The necessities for people in other societies, say, in 
a small island in the Polynesia probably would not be the same. 
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 Against the relative perspective, absolute poverty advocates say that the 
arguments presented above are intended to discuss to inequalities, that will exist in every 
society. Moreover, they say that relative poverty researchers are illegitimately broadening 
the concept of poverty in order to advocate redistribution of wealth. For them, who 
defends an absolute concept of poverty is tackling the “main” issue of the condition of 
the poor, their lack of subsistence, while researchers that defend a relative concept are 
trying to approach something deeper and more contested aspect, which is, the problem of 
inequality (ALCOCK, 2006). 
 Relative poverty theorists argue that this is a misunderstanding because 
subsistence is not a stable and fixed concept present in every society in the same way. 
Then, again, in order to understand what a specific society conceives as minimal 
subsistence conditions, it is necessary to understand the social patterns that are present. 
So, the study of relative poverty is not exclusively a political project to fight inequalities 
and to promote income or wealth redistribution, it is another perspective to define and to 
fight poverty. 
 If subsistence is a key concept in the absolute poverty perspective, researchers 
that adopt a relative definition are focused in the concept of deprivation. For them, 
deprivation is a broader concept than poverty but it might be used in order to define more 
precisely who are the poor. According to Townsend (1987, p. 125) deprivation is the “[…] 
state of observable and demonstrable disadvantage relative to the local community or the 
wider society or nation to which and individual, family or group belongs”. This idea 
focuses more on conditions, rather than resources and these conditions can be more 
objective i.e. material ones or can be more subjective or social.  
It is noticeable that the concept of deprivation presented above is very similar to 
Townsend’ definition of poverty, quoted above. This proximity is explained by the fact 
that for the author poverty is a case of severe deprivation. As Townsend (1987) points 
out, the adoption of the concept of deprivation allows to consider people who does not 
have some of the elements that are widely approved in their society. People that have 
access to a proper diet and condition of clothing, housing and household facilities 
(material conditions) can be considered deprived if there is no access to them to the 
political system as citizens, or if there is no recognition of them as part of that society. It 
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is possible to say, in Townsend’s terms, that these people are deprived in terms of social 
conditions, even though the minimal material conditions are fully met. 
 Poverty, then, can be understood as the situation in which people are deprived in 
a broader range of material and social aspects that are fundamental to live in a certain 
society. People can be deprived in some areas without being necessarily poor. Townsend 
(1987, p. 131) assumes that: “[…] at a certain point in descending the scale of income or 
resources deprivation is likely to grow disproportionate to further loss of resources and 
that this ‘threshold’ properly marks the beginning of a state of objective poverty”. Then, 
people that experience multiple or single but very severe forms of deprivation are more 
likely to have very little income and little or no other resources, being considered, then, 
as poor. 
 It is important to highlight that the distinction between absolute and relative 
concepts of poverty is not so extreme, that the adoption of one conception implies in the 
complete disregard of elements of the other one. Even Rowntree, considered one of the 
founders of the absolute concept used relative measures is his studies about poverty in 
Britain (VEIT-WILSON, 1986; SEN, 1997).1 We will return on this point next section, 
considering the Sen x Townsend debate. 
It is important to notice that both definitions, absolute and relative have its 
advantages as well as its own limits. In light of that, Alcock (2006, p. 68) says that 
adopting just one of them is neither acceptable or workable: “If we wish to retain poverty 
as a basis for analysis, measurement and ultimately political action, therefore we need to 
avoid disadvantages of both, or rather to capitalize their advantages”. 
 Having presented the main ideas concerning the absolute and relative definitions 
of poverty, the last part of this section will approach the measurement of poverty. There 
is a certain overlap in defining and measuring poverty, and in that sense the question of 
measuring poverty is part of the conceptual conflict between absolute and relative 
definitions of poverty.  
Researchers that adopt an absolute definition of poverty try to measure it in an 
indirect way, considering basically people’s income as the key variable to define if 
 
1 Rowntree included in his studies a definition of secondary poverty, that comprised elements that might be 
considered as relative poverty aspects (VEIT-WILSON, 1986; SEN, 1997). 
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someone is poor or not. As discussed earlier, researchers that define poverty in an absolute 
way are worried about people’s subsistence understood as the resources necessary to 
achieve a minimum level of consumption that allows someone to live. The income 
oriented approach is manifested through the widely-known poverty line2, which is a 
certain amount of money that represents when someone can be considered to be in the 
subsistence level. Another possible approach is to set a basket of goods according to local 
nutritional and consumption standards, that may determine the basic income necessary to 
someone have subsistence conditions (ALCOCK, 2006; RINGEN, 1988). 
On the other hand, researchers that adopt a relative definition of poverty try to 
measure it directly, considering the standards of consumption of goods and of social 
conditions to be considered part of a specific society. As seen before, deprivation is a key 
concept here and then researchers try to measure the standards of living of people, 
considering the patterns of consumption of goods and the access to aspects of the social 
life in a specific society (RINGEN, 1988; TOWNSEND, 1987). 
This second perspective has attracted some criticism in the literature. Ringen 
(1988) points out that regardless the adoption of a relative definition of poverty, most 
researchers have tried to measure poverty adopting an indirect measure, which is, the 
poverty line method. This is, according to him, an internal inconsistency, because these 
authors have based their research in a perspective that involves the many aspects of the 
standards of living of someone in some specific society, but they try to measure it 
indirectly focusing only on the income of those people.3 
Townsend (1987) tries to remedy that inconsistency by proposing a deprivation 
index is intended be so comprehensive as possible, involving the diverse aspects of 
material and social deprivation. This index considers the following variables: a) as aspects 
of material deprivation: diet, clothing, housing and home facilities, environmental 
conditions; and working conditions; b) as aspects of social deprivation: lack of rights in 
 
2 The World Bank tries to produce a global poverty line, intended to allow cross-country comparison and 
aggregation (GORDON, 2002). According to the World Bank website the poverty line nowadays 
considers that people who can’t live at least with US$ 1.90 per day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) 
are poor (THE WORLD BANK, 2017). 
3  This is the so-called income proxy approach, that recognizes the limitations of the budget standard method 
and tries to remedy it considering the actual patterns of expenditure of people rather than considering only 
a hypothetical expert judgement (ALCOCK, 2006; VEIT-WILSON, 1987). 
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employment, family activity, lack of integration into community, lack of participation in 
social institutions, recreational deprivation and educational deprivation. 
It is noticeable that the deprivation index looks for a wider range of aspects, in 
order to diagnose deprivation. It is a more direct way of analyzing the situation, than the 
poverty line method. But it also implies in a bigger involvement of the researcher in 
determining the variables that will be assessed in the various indicators pointed above, 
aspect that has attracted some criticism and concern. Townsend’s measures have been 
labeled as quite arbitrary in the sense that it is the researcher that is defining social 
priorities of a specific community (ALCOCK, 2006). Using this kind of measure of 
poverty is also challenging because it demands to treat and to analyze various amounts of 
data obtained, to make reliable judgements about the results obtained. 
A third way of measuring poverty is to consider both direct and indirect ways of 
measuring poverty together, these are the multi-dimensional approaches to poverty 
(ALCOCK, 2006; GORDON, 2002). Sen, as will be discussed in the next sections can be 
considered one advocate of this multi-dimensional perspective, encompassing the 
absolute and relative dimensions of poverty into his capability approach. 
This first section has discussed some general aspects regarding the definition and 
the measurement of poverty. The presented aspects make possible to go further in this 
analysis, to consider the Sen x Townsend debate that happened in the first half of the 
1980s, concerning the absolute and relative definitions and measurements of poverty. 
2. The Sen x Townsend debate 
In the period of 1983-1985 the journal Oxford Economic Papers published an 
debate between Sen (1983, 1985a) and Townsend regarding the definition of poverty. 
These papers were influential to stablish the limits of the dichotomy between absolute 
and relative conceptions of poverty, as well as are relevant in order to understand Sen’s 
turning point to his capability approach4 and, as part of it, present his own perspective 
regarding poverty. 
 
4 The beginning of the capability approach is related with the moment that Sen integrated his previous 
works regarding poverty and famines with his criticism of the utilitarianism and its reflects in the 
economic theory (SUGDEN, 1986; ROBEYNS, 2005b). This turn started with Equality of What? from 
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 In Poor, relatively speaking Sen (1983) recognizes that the relative conceptions 
of poverty have become a consensus in the studies of poverty and these conceptions, 
according to him, have some merit over the simplistic conceptualization of absolute 
poverty. However, the relative conception of poverty fails in not recognizing some 
absolute aspects that are present in the phenomenon of poverty. Sen (1983, p. 153) 
considers that: “[…] ultimately poverty must be seen to be primarily an absolute notion, 
even though the specification of the absolute levels has to be done quite differently from 
the way it used to be done in the older tradition”. Moreover, Sen proposes that the poverty 
does not rely only in an absolute or relative dimension, but in the absolute standard of 
living instead, that can be comprised in this way: an absolute deprivation in terms of a 
person’s capabilities and a relative deprivation in terms of access to commodities, 
incomes and resources. 
 Sen (1983) argues that the relative definitions of poverty have brought some 
important advances in the field, specially by broadening the scope of the studies, 
including social aspects involved with the experience of being poor. But, despite these 
contributions, this perspective has failed specially because of two general problems: a) 
researchers confused the absoluteness of needs with its fixity over time; b) the second 
problem, more complex, states that there is a difference between achieving relatively less 
than others and achieving absolutely less because of falling behind others. 
The first critique addresses the argument presented by some relative poverty 
scholars, that the relative definition would involve variation over time while the absolute 
perspective would involve fixity over time of its key variables. According to Sen (1983) 
absoluteness of needs does not imply their fixity over time. Then, neither the absolute nor 
the relative definition of poverty involve fixity over time: “Even under an absolutist 
approach, the poverty line will be a function of some variables, and there is no a priori 
reason why these variables might not change over time” (SEN, 1983, p. 155). 
The second critique considers that the problem of poverty does not involve only 
the fact of being relatively better or worse than others, but also a matter of an absolute 
difference between people. To put it in other words: the absolute achievement of someone 
 
and continued with another two texts originally published in 1985, Commodities and capabilities and 
Well-being, agency and freedom. As we can see the Sen x Townsend debate occurred in the midst of that 
turn in the Senian thought (SEN, 1980, 1984, 1985b). 
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in a certain space may depend on a relative position in some other space (SEN, 1983). As 
we shall see in the following paragraphs, Sen argues that there is an absolute core of 
poverty, in the space of capabilities, while there is a relative aspect of poverty related with 
the provision of goods or even income. 
 Sen (1981, 1983, 1986) manifest his concerns of a rigid relativist view, that may 
conceive that poverty simply cannot be eliminated, because in every society there will be 
some people that will be badly off the others and that people will be, relatively speaking, 
poor, even if they have the minimal conditions necessary to have a modest life. Then, it 
is very difficult to distinguish the problem of poverty in relation to the general discussion 
about inequalities in any society. Sen does not deny the relevance of the discussion about 
inequalities5, but for him interpret poverty as only an inequality matter is a 
misunderstanding. As he shows if in a specific society, a sharp fall in general prosperity 
brings problems with famine and hardship it seems that there is a true movement of 
intensification of poverty. But adopting a concept of poverty as only a form of inequality 
may result in this scenario: if the differences between the bottom 20% or 10% and the 
rest of society remain the same, then this situation of starvation is not related with the 
increase of poverty in that society at all! Poverty, relatively speaking, remain the same in 
that hypothetical society (SEN, 1983). 
 Sen (1983) proposes, then, that there is an absolute core in the concept of poverty, 
that involves aspects as the facts that people suffer from starvation, malnutrition and 
avoidable diseases, even in developed countries. The point is: the absolute satisfaction of 
some needs might depend on a person’s relative position in front of others. Sen takes the 
concept of necessities from Adam Smith, quoted in the first section, not as an argument 
in favor of a relative concept of poverty but, on contrary, for him Smith (1791) stresses 
the aspect that not only the customs of a society are important, the fact that the worker 
will find himself or herself ashamed among the other members is crucial, this is an 
absolute aspect. 
 At this point, Sen (1983) introduces his concept of poverty focused in the notion 
of functionings and capabilities. The right focus of poverty is neither upon commodities, 
nor in personal characteristics, or even in the concept of utility, but in the real freedoms 
 
5 See Sen (1992, 2000). 
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that people actually have to realize what they want (Sen 1985b, 1992). The capability can 
be conceived as a kind of freedom that allows the individual to choose the kind of 
functioning of his or her preference, in a wider range of possible options. It can be seen 
as a freedom to have different life styles (SEN, 1992, 2000). 
 In that sense, Sen (1983) concludes that when considering a definition of poverty, 
it is important to take capabilities as an absolute component, but the commodities 
necessary to someone function adequately may be taken as a relative one.6 Analyzing the 
Smithian quotation it noticed that the capability of avoiding shame from inability to meet 
the demands of society was the reason why the hypothetical English worker had to use a 
linen shirt and leather shoes, in another societies the commodities may be others (e.g. a 
silk robe and sandals, etc.). Then, for Sen there is no conflict between absolute and 
relative perspectives of poverty, there is an absolute component, capabilities, that are 
subject to the relativity in terms of commodities.7 
 Even though Sen did not discuss specifically Townsend’s perspective on relative 
poverty8, Townsend (1985) tried to answer Sen’s critiques. According to him, Sen did not 
represent adequately the concept of relative deprivation and, also, by using the concept 
of capability he gave “[…] confused grounds for retaining an ‘absolute’ core to the 
meaning of poverty” (TOWNSEND, 1985, p. 659). 
 Townsend (1985) tries to answer the two general critiques proposed by Sen: a) 
the confusion over absoluteness of needs with fixity over time; b) the difference between 
achieving relatively less and absolutely less because of falling behind others. Regarding 
the first one Townsend states that Sen has said something quite different from the majority 
of the absolute poverty researchers. Moreover, Sen, according to him, does not recognize 
that the relative deprivation approach tries to adopt a scientific definition that allows 
comparisons through time about changes in conditions within a single society and 
between different societies at a simultaneous moment of time. 
 
6  According to Sen (1986): “Some capabilities such as being well-nourished may have more or less similar 
demands on commodities (such as food and health services) irrespective of the average opulence of the 
community in which the person lives. Other capabilities, such as the ones with which Adam Smith was 
particularly concerned, have commodity demands that vary a good deal with average opulence”. 
7 In line with this reasoning Sen (1981, p. 17) stated: “Thus the approach of relative deprivation supplements 
rather than supplants the analysis of poverty in terms of absolute dispossession”. 
8 In fact, Sen has assessed the relative poverty approaches in general. 
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 About the second critique, Townsend (1985) considers that Sen discusses people’s 
advantage, not deprivation and, according to him, it seems that Sen bases poverty more 
in terms of individual motivation, than in terms of social organization. Townsend points 
out that in any society the level of resources available to the local community determines 
whether or not individuals from that community will satisfy social obligations, 
expectations, customs and needs. The author criticizes also the focus on hunger of the 
Senian approach because this, according to him, can underestimate the importance of 
other needs than food. Then, in his conception the way that Sen presents poverty is 
minimalist in the sense that it ignores or underestimate the importance of certain forms 
of social needs opening the door to a tough state interpretation of subsistence rations.  
Townsend (1985) also criticizes the proposed definition of poverty in terms of 
capabilities, especially as way of generalizing a form of measuring poverty. He questions 
the empirical implications and applicability of the proposed notion, considering that Sen 
did not focused in the fact that needs are socially constructed. According to the author: 
“These are social notions and this is what I would insist upon. Types of need, even 
capabilities in the sense used by Professor Sen, are socially created and have to be 
identified and measured in that spirit” (TOWNSEND, 1985, p. 667, emphasis from the 
author). Townsend concludes, then, that Sen manifests a sophisticated adaptation of the 
individualism of the neo-classical economics. 
 It is noticeable in this debate that there is a certain clash between the economic 
and philosophical grounding that Sen gives to his approach to poverty with the 
sociological and more empirically driven perspective taken by Townsend. As Townsend 
(1985, p. 664) states about Sen’s continuous attempt to characterize hunger and starvation 
as an absolute core of the concept of poverty: “I find this passage wholly unacceptable. 
He does not say anything about the scientific criteria by which he identifies, or prioritise 
human needs”. In another point of the text Townsend (1985, p. 665) argues that the 
Achilles heel of the Senian argument is that “He does not offer any serious criteria of 
poverty independent of income”. Townsend, as it seems, does not recognize the capability 
approach as way to define poverty and then considers that Sen does not have such a 
definition at all. The author also considers that the roots of a conception of need come 
from society and the capability perspective tends to generalize the individual motivation 
and prioritization of needs as a general criterion. This is the reason why Townsend 
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accuses Sen of adopting a conception of poverty based upon neo-classical economics, 
though Sen (1977, 1985b, 2000, 2004b) manifested in his works a strong criticism of this 
perspective. 
 In the same number of the Oxford Economic Papers Sen (1985a) published a reply 
to Townsend. Sen highlights that Townsend has confined the critics of Sen (1983) to his 
own work appearing that the general argument of the paper was directed to Townsend’s 
perspective only. Sen understands that the main criticism of Townsend relies upon the 
conception of absolute and relative dimensions of poverty altogether: “Poverty is not just 
a matter of being relatively poorer than others in the society, but of not having certain 
minimum ‘capabilities’” (SEN, 1985a, p. 669, emphasis from the author). Applying the 
capability approach in the analysis of poverty implies in recognizing that: “[…] it is a 
question of setting certain absolute standards of minimum material capabilities relevant 
for that society. Anyone falling to reach that absolute level would then be classified as 
poor no matter what his relative position is vis-à-vis others” (SEN, 1985a, p. 670).9 
 According to Sen, the minimum list varies from society to society, reflecting 
contemporary standards, but this aspect does not imply that the exercise of specifying the 
poverty standards is purely subjective. Sen (1980, p. 17) addresses the subject as follows: 
“For the person studying and measuring poverty, the conventions of society are matters 
of fact (what are the contemporary standards?), and not issues of morality or of subjective 
research (what should be the contemporary standards?) […]”. 
 Then, the Senian approach is not income based as Townsend represented, it 
considers that the failure of someone to achieve a certain minimum of capabilities is 
intrinsically related with poverty (Sen, 1985a). Moving forward, the author points the fact 
that Townsend misrepresented the Senian argument, by saying that the advocacy of an 
absolute core is based only in the matter of food provision, ignoring that the absolute 
deprivations may be of other kind, than only nutrition standards. As Sen (1985a, p. 673, 
emphasis from the author) concludes: 
The characteristic feature of “absoluteness” is neither constancy over time, nor invariance 
between different societies, nor concentration merely on food and nutrition. It is an approach 
 
9 As Sen (1981, p. 17) has pointed: “A famine, for example, will be readily accepted as a case of acute 
poverty no matter what the relative pattern within the society happens to be. Indeed, there is an irreducible 
core of absolute deprivation in our idea of poverty, which translates reports of starvation, malnutrition 
and visible hardship into a diagnosis of poverty without having to ascertain first the relative picture”. 
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of judging a person’s deprivation in absolute terms (in the case of the poverty study, in terms 
of a certain specified minimum absolute levels), rather than in purely relative terms vis-à-vis 
the levels enjoyed by others in society. 
 Sen (1985a) also argues that he has never intended that the capabilities are the 
same everywhere, neither that the concept of poverty, taken as the minimum levels of 
capabilities, is the same everywhere. Despite of that misconceptions, Sen concludes his 
reply stating that there are some common aspects in his capability approach to poverty 
when compared with the deprivation conception of Townsend, like the social nature of 
needs. Though, both approaches are not equal, because while Townsend focuses in the 
relative social conditions, Sen’s focus is directed towards the real freedoms that people 
who are poor actually have. In the next section we will advance the Senian perspective.    
3. Poverty as lack of capabilities 
As seen in the previous sections, Sen (1983, 1985a) tries to move forward from 
the absolute x relative definitions of poverty applying his capability approach to the 
analysis of poverty. Given the fact that the relative perspective was dominating the 
discussions at his time, this was an important contribution in the field. The capability 
approach is a theory of how people in fact live, that can contribute on explaining what 
poverty is, and also how poverty and another problems related with the absence of 
capabilities can be dealt from the perspective of the individual, the society in general and 
from governments as well. In this third section the capability approach will be briefly 
presented and then the definition of poverty in Sen will be further discussed. 
Sen (1985b, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2004b) departs from a distinction between 
two aspects of a person: the well-being aspect and the agency aspect, considering both 
relevant in the evaluation of people’s doings and beings. The first one is related with the 
person’s achievements and the opportunities in the context of his/her personal advantage 
and the second one with other objectives and values, going possibly beyond the pursuit 
of one’s own well-being. 
Both aspects, the agency and the well-being, are interdependent among each other, 
no substantial variation in one can be obtained without some variation in the other. But 
they are not identical, nor so closely linked that the personal analysis can be done 
considering only the agency or only the well-being aspect. In this sense, not all the 
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person’s activities look for maximizing the own well-being, as many utilitarian 
philosophers and welfare economists have proposed, one person can throw away his/her 
own advantage in favor of another values, like helping others, or honoring a sense of 
citizenship or patriotism (SEN, 2004b). 
Each one of these aspects correspond to a certain kind of freedom. Sen (1985b, 
1992, 2000) adds the importance of including freedom, understood as a person’s options 
and opportunities as an aspect to be considered in a normative evaluation. In this 
reasoning, besides of considering the personal achievements in terms of agency or well-
being it is crucial to consider the freedoms that someone has to act as an agent and also 
to pursue his/her own well-being. So, there is an agency freedom and also a well-being 
freedom.10 
It is in the well-being aspect of the person that Sen (1985b, 1992, 1993, 2000) 
places the definitions of functionings and capabilities. According to him, a person’s well-
being can be conceived in terms of the ways of a person can function, which is, the various 
doings and beings that can be assessed as functionings. In this sense, to live can be seen 
as having a bundle of functionings inter-related. These functionings can be seen as 
activities (eating, reading, seeing) or states of existence or being, from the elementary 
ones (being well nourished, being free from avoidable diseases) to more complex as (not 
being ashamed of his own clothing, taking part in the life of the community, having self-
respect). The set of functionings that a person actually achieves is defined as his/her 
functioning vector. According to Sen (1993, p. 37): “The claim is that the functionings 
make up a person's being, and the evaluation of a person's well-being has to take the form 
of an assessment of these constituent elements”. 
From the concept of functionings it is possible to derive the concept of capability, 
understood as a set of conditions that allow the functionings that are feasible to a person 
to achieve: 
In the space of functionings any point, representing an n-tuple of functionings, reflects a 
combination of the person's doings and beings, relevant to the exercise. The capability is a 
set of such functioning n-tuples, representing the various alternative combinations of beings 
and doings any one (combination) of which the person can choose. Capability is thus defined 
in the space of functionings. If a functioning achievement (in the form of an n-tuple of 
 
10 “If, for example, all the alternatives other than the one actually chosen were to be eliminated, this need 
not affect achievement (since chosen alternative can be still chosen), but the person clearly has less 
freedom, and this may be seen as a loss of some importance” (SEN, 2004b, p. 60). 
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functionings) is a point in that space, capability is a set of such points (representing the alter-
native functioning n-tuples from which one n-tuple can be chosen) (SEN, 1993, p. 37). 
Capability, in these terms, is a kind of substantive freedom, as discussed before, 
the freedom to achieve different alternative functioning combinations, which represent 
the freedom to choose among different lifestyles (Sen, 1985b, 1992, 1993, 2000). 
As Rego and Pinzani (2014) point out, capability is a concept that is not limited 
to the notion of capacity, nor the ability, but is considers both together, plus the mental 
states and other subjective states like being healthy, alphabetized, etc., including also 
external circumstances. To say that someone has the capability to move to another city 
does not mean only that this person can physically move his/her, but also implies the real 
options that this person has to do it. That is the reason why capability can be a measure 
of the degree of substantial freedoms that a person has, to live the kind of life that his/her 
values. 
An example presented by Sen (2000) may help us understand the concept of 
capability. According to Sen riding a bike means to use this instrument (this commodity) 
for transportation purposes. Having a bike gives to someone the possibility to move about 
in a certain way that he/she might not be able to without it, which means that the 
transportation characteristic of a bike gives to someone the capability of moving in a 
certain way. One person might use the bike to go to work or might use it for leisure. Even 
in the first case, as Rego and Pinzani (2014) shows us a person can use this bike because 
he has an environmental consciousness or because this kind of transport is faster than 
his/her car, during the rush hour. On the other hand, the bike can be used by someone 
because he/she does not have a car and there is no public transportation to his/her 
destination or even he/she does not have the money to pay for the bus. In this example, it 
is noticeable that the bike can realize different functionings for different people, it is the 
cyclist condition that makes the whole difference. According to Rego and Pinzani (2014, 
p. 68, our translation): “[…] a rich executive with ecological consciousness that goes with 
a bike to his office and a poor laborer that goes with his bike to the industry where he 
works are sharing the same functioning, but for different reasons and deeply different 
contexts”. 
In evaluating someone’s well-being, Sen conceives that it is important to consider, 
also, his or her conversion factors of income or commodities into functionings. In this 
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sense Sen (1999) considers that it is not possible to simply compare the capabilities or the 
functionings achieved by different persons. For example, in comparing the bread 
consumption of two persons it is not enough to compare the amount of bread that both 
buy or eat. A person that is disabled can have more access to commodities and still have 
less chances to live a normal life, pursuing the objectives he or she values, than someone 
that is not in the same condition. According to him:  
Handicaps, such as age or disability or illness, reduce one's ability to earn income. But they 
also make it harder to convert income into capability, since an older, or more disabled, or 
more seriously ill person may need more income (for assistance, for prosthesis, for treatment) 
to achieve the same functionings (even when that achievement is at all possible). This entails 
that "real poverty'' (in terms of capability deprivation) may be, in a significant sense, more 
intense than what appears in the income space. This can be a crucial concern in assessing 
public action to assist the elderly and other groups with "conversion" difficulties in addition 
to lowness of income (SEN, 2000, p. 88). 
In Development as Freedom Sen (2000) presents five kinds of conversion factors: 
a) personal heterogeneities; b) environmental diversities; c) variations in social climate; 
d) differences in relational perspectives; e) distribution within the family. 
The first group is related with the disparities discussed above, involving personal 
differences such as age, physical characteristics, differences related with gender, 
propension to diseases etc.11 The second one, environmental diversities, points to 
climatic circumstances (temperature ranges, rainfall, and so on), that might influence 
what a person obtains with a specific level of income. The third aspect is related with the 
availability (or not) of public services as education, public health and social security, the 
presence of high levels of criminality, and also the social relations (the so called social 
capital12) (SEN, 2000).  
The fourth group of conversion factors of income into capabilities involve 
variations in the stablished patterns of behavior that may vary between communities, 
depending on conventions and customs. Here it is possible to see again some reasons 
presented in the Sen’s exchange with Townsend. The author highlights that being 
relatively poor in an affluent community may impede he or she to achieve elementary 
 
11 A person with renal problems, that needs Hemodialysis has a problem to convert income and resources 
in functionings, that are different from a healthy person. That is the reason why the adequacy from 
income to avoid poverty varies according with personal characteristics and circumstances (SEN, 1992). 
12 See Putnam (1995). 
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functionings, like to be part of the community life, even though his or her income, in 
absolute terms, may be higher than the level of income at which members of poorer 
communities achieve their own functionings. This kind of variation is intersocial, in the 
sense than it is related with the relative advantages of two persons that are located in 
different countries or communities (SEN, 2000). 
The last conversion factor is the intrafamily (or intrahousehold) distribution of 
income. Sen’s (2000) analysis highlights that incomes earned by one or more family 
members of a family are shared by all members, the earners and the nonearners. Though, 
the distribution of income inside the families may not be equal between the family 
members and this aspect is fundamental in the analysis of the conditions of each member 
to convert their share of the family income into capabilities.13 
The conversion factors presented above does not involve only the 
acknowledgement that there are interpersonal differences. The fact is that these 
differences may induce a difficulty to someone convert his or her personal income into 
capabilities, and this fact may not be ignored when studying phenomena like poverty or 
social inequalities. This is the reason why a simple equality of income, commodities or 
resources may not result in an equal treatment, due to differences in a person’s conversion 
factors (SEN 1980, 2000). 
Robeyns (2005b) also points that in recognizing the relevance of the conversion 
factors the capability approach represents human diversity in two forms: a) by focusing 
in the plurality of functionings and capabilities that might be chosen by someone; b) by 
explicitly focusing in the different conversion factors among people. 
These elements are sufficient in order to analyze the Senian perspective regarding 
poverty as lack of capabilities. In this point it is important to present the concept of basic 
capabilities14, that was first presented in Equality of What? (SEN, 1980) and that was 
further developed in Sen (1993). Given that poverty might be better defined in terms of a 
deprivation of capabilities, which is, the lack of real opportunities that someone has to 
plain and to achieve his/her life plans, for evaluative purposes Sen argues that it is 
 
13 For example, Sen (1992, 2000) highlights that gender inequality is a relevant factor in the intrafamily 
distribution in several Asian countries and in northern Africa. These differences in treatment impact in 
bigger levels or mortality, morbidity, malnutrition or the absence of medical treatment. 
14 The definition of basic capabilities in Sen is quite different of that proposed by Nussbaum (2000). As we 
shall see in this section. 
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important to identify a subset of crucially important capabilities, that might orient the 
analysis of the people who are worst off in a given community, these capabilities may be 
labeled as basic capabilities (SEN, 1993; CROCKER; ROBEYNS, 2010). 
The basic capabilities then are related to the ability to satisfy certain crucially 
important functionings up to minimally adequate levels. People who are not able to 
achieve this threshold might be considered “scandalously deprived” (SEN, 1993, p, 40). 
This concept might be used as a new approach to diagnose and to measure poverty, 
instead of the traditional adoption of the income criterion, as discussed previously, 
considering that the basic capability measure is sensitive to the problem of the conversion 
factors. 
Which capabilities should be considered as basic ones? The specification of which 
capabilities are relevant to poverty analysis or even to define the minimum conditions to 
have a valuable life is something that Sen is not committed with. As opposed to 
Nussbaum’s (2000, 2003) project of defining “basic capabilities” that should be provided 
by governments, Sen (2000, 2004a, 2011) understands that it is the role of the democracy, 
understood as the “government by discussion”, the role of defining what are the relevant 
capabilities.15 
Due to this reasoning Sen does not present us a list of capabilities that should be 
labeled as basic, and therefore used in order to define who is poor. Though, it is possible 
to find in some of his works a group of certain capabilities that are essential do good 
human functioning, such as the following: a) to move about; b) the ability to meet one’s 
nutritional requirements and to avoid morbidity and mortality; c) the ability to be 
physically fit; c) the wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered; d) to have access to 
participate in the social life of the community (SEN, 1980, 1993, 2004a; DRÈZE; SEN, 
2002).16 
In discussing the selection of relevant capabilities, Sen (2004a) emphasizes that 
there is, and there should not be a fixed universal list of capabilities in his perspective of 
 
15 On this subject see: Robeyns (2005b), Crocker and Robeyns (2010). 
16 According to Sen (1993, p. 30): “In the context of some types of social analysis, for example, in dealing 
with extreme poverty in developing economies, we may be able to go a fairly long distance with a 
relatively small number of centrally important functionings and the corresponding basic capabilities (e.g. 
the ability to be well nourished and well sheltered, the capability of escaping avoidable morbidity and 
premature mortality, and so forth). In other contexts, including more general problems of economic 
development, the list may have to be much longer and much more diverse”. 
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the capability approach. According to him: “To insist on a fixed forever list of capabilities 
would deny the possibility of progress in social understanding and also go against the 
productive role of public discussion, social agitation, and open debates” (SEN, 2004a, p. 
80). However, the author manifest that it is admissible to define some specific lists in 
order to conduct empirical research on poverty and that he himself made such exercise 
when he assessed the extent of poverty in India (SEN, 1993, 2004a).17 So, the capability 
approach not only is useful in order to define poverty, but also by proposing a better way 
of measuring poverty, by defining and using capabilities lists for research purposes. 
Considering all the aspects presented here it is possible to conclude that Sen uses 
the term basic capabilities to advance his own definition of poverty. Poverty might be 
defined as comprised of two dimensions, an absolute one and another that is relative 
(SEN, 1983, 1985b). The absolute core might be understood as the absence of basic 
capabilities, and the relative aspect is related with the access to commodities, income and 
resources. The list of basic capabilities, though, is not universal, it varies from society to 
society, according with the functionings and respective capabilities that are considered 
valuable for each society, and that aspect must also be considered when researching 
poverty (SEN, 1993, 2000; DRÈZE; SEN, 2002). 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the existing definitions of poverty, 
especially considering the absolute and relative traditional ways of definition, in order to 
analyze the Senian definition of poverty as the deprivation of capabilities. In light of our 
previous discussion, it is possible to draw some conclusions. 
 First, it is noticeable, that the proposed definition of poverty as the lack of 
capabilities comprises both absolute and relative notions of poverty. Sen does not deny 
the importance of the social processes that define what is the standard of living shared 
among individuals in a specific community and then we might say that the functionings 
that are necessary for someone to be considered part of a specific community varies from 
 
17 Following this perspective, some authors are trying to define some criteria in selecting relevant 
capabilities for research purposes, such as Alkire (2002, 2005) and Robeyns (2003, 2005a). 
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society to society, as Townsend and his colleagues have diagnosed. But there is an 
absolute core in the notion of poverty, which is the fact that people who are poor does not 
have the same range of options that people who are not poor do have. Therefore, poverty 
might be seen as this deficit in terms of basic capabilities that people should have to live 
their own life. 
 The capabilities, then, are absolute in the Senian perspective, but the specification 
of which capabilities are fundamental, in terms of commodities or of social participation 
is something that varies from society to society and then can be considered as a relative 
aspect. The quoted passage from Adam Smith is very emblematic in this sense. For the 
18th century English laborer the linen shirt and the leather shoes are an important aspect 
to be considered part of that society. Without them the laborer would see himself 
ashamed. 
 A second conclusion is that this definition of poverty can be considered important 
because it serves not only as a working concept that may help empirical research about 
poverty, but that can also guide political action as well. Differently from the absolute and 
relative notions presented in this article, the Senian account of poverty is rooted in a 
philosophical ground that allows either a philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of 
poverty, in terms of social justice, well-being, agency, and so on, but also an empirical 
analysis of the way how people in fact live and can serve as basis and orientation to the 
design of social policies that try to deal with the phenomenon of poverty increasing the 
range of options of people who are poor, instead of guiding them to a certain way of live.18 
 A third element that should be highlighted is that the Senian definition of poverty 
differs from the absolute definitions and relative definitions because it recognizes that it 
is important to look at the differences in the conversion factors that people have, that may 
favor or even impede the conversion of income or even commodities into capabilities. 
The relative poverty perspective is different from absolute poverty, because it considers 
intersocial variations among societies, but it does not recognize that there are 
interpersonal variations as well, such as personal heterogeneities and variations among 
the family (or household) members. 
 
18 In this sense, it is recommended to see the analysis of Rego and Pinzani (2014) from the results of the 
Programa Bolsa Familia in Brazil. 
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 A fourth aspect that can be highlighted is that this definition of poverty allows us 
to look at the functionings that are considered worthy by each community also 
problematize them by submitting it to the process of public reasoning. For Sen (1985a, 
2000, 2004a) it is not the task of the researcher to determine which capabilities are 
universally valuable and which are not. That is the reason why the author did not offer a 
closed list of capabilities but in the other hand he advocates the importance of the 
democracy, understood as the “government by discussion” (Sen, 2006, 2011) as the space 
where people will have conditions to prioritize the capabilities deficits that demand 
governmental action. On the other hand, Sen (1993, 2004b) considers that researchers can 
build capabilities lists, for specific research purposes and, in this way, they might try to 
define which are the basic capabilities necessary in order to evaluate poverty in an specific 
community, or in a broader population. 
 We stressed this aspect because the attempts of measuring poverty in relative 
terms, especially following Townsend’s proposals have received some criticisms of being 
quite arbitrary, because it was the researcher who was defining what are the standards of 
living of a specific community he/she is researching. The senian perspective tries to avoid 
this kind of criticism by stressing that a third party that should not exclusively define what 
are the goods and social interactions that a person must have access, in order not to be 
poor (what capabilities are fundamental). The same can be said about a researcher or a 
policymaker. The own community that is being researched should have voice in order to 
manifest which capabilities are relevant for them.  
 These four reasons presented above shows us that a definition of poverty in terms 
of the deprivation of capabilities can be very adequate, not only as a philosophical or 
scientific definition, that has been basing very important researches in the field, but also 
as a practical concept, that allows us to look at those deficits of capabilities, that might 
amplify the range of feasible options for those who live in poverty. 
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